Foreign Direct Investment and Government Policy in Central and Eastern Europe by Meyer, Klaus E. & Jensen, Camilla
 1 
Foreign Direct Investment and Government Policy  
in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
 
Klaus E Meyer 
km.cees@cbs.dk 
 
and 
Camilla Jensen 
cj.cees@cbs.dk, 
 
 
Copenhagen Business School 
Center for East European Studies, 
Copenhagen Business School, 
Howitzvej 60, 2000 Frederiksberg, 
Denmark. Tel. (+45) 3815 3033, 
Fax (+45) 3815 2500. 
http://www.cbs.dk/centres/cees/ 
 
January, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements : We thank Robert Grosse and participants of the conference on 
International Business and Government Relations in the 21st Century in Phoenix 
Arizona for their comments on an early draft of this paper. We thank Thunderbird 
AGSIM for sponsoring the event.  
 
Note: this paper is a draft for the book on “International Business and Government 
Relations in the 21st Century”, Festschrift in Honor of Jack Behrmann, edited by 
Robert Grosse. Other contributors are: Jean Boddewyn, Joohn Dunning, Lee Preston, 
John Stopford, Thomas Brewer, Dong-Song Cho, Stephen Kobrin, Ravia Ramamurti, 
Stefan H. Robock, Dennis Rondinelli, Louis T. Wells, Paul Streeten, Lorraine Eden 
with Stephanie Lenway and Doug Shuler, Robert Grosse, Alan Rugman, Yadong Luo, 
and Alvint G. Wint.  
 2 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Government Policy  
in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
ABSTRACT 
The 1990s have been a period of extraordinary politics in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). This chapter discusses how the transition from state to market has created 
bureaucratic barriers to entry, but also windows of opportunity for foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The high costs and high investment risks associated with FDI in 
CEE are a reflection the institutional development. Thus, inflows of FDI have been 
largest in those countries that made most progress in establishing a market-oriented 
institutional framework.  
After outlining trends of institutional change and their impact on FDI, this 
chapter discusses how aspects of the institutional framework and FDI policy affect 
diverse types of investment projects. Acquisition and Greenfield investors are 
concerned with different aspects of government policy: privatization and regulatory 
policies for acquirers and investment incentives, regional policy and special economic 
zones for Greenfield investors. The shifting policy priorities have thus changed the 
types of projects undertaken by foreign investors in the region. 
 
1. Introduction 
Relationships between MNE and governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
have been shaped by the region’s struggle to shed legacies of central planning, and 
create prosperous market economies. This context has created special challenges for 
both MNE and local governments to establish relations with each other, understand 
each others needs, and to engage in mutually beneficial negotiations.  
Due to path dependency of institutions, extraordinary policies during this 
period and the inheritance from the previous regime shape the future institutional 
frameworks (North 1990, Stark 1992). Policy decisions during the period of radical 
change around 1990, such as methods of privatization, had a long- lasting effect on 
institutions, but also on the distribution of wealth and power. In many countries, the 
institutional vacuum and weak legal framework in the early 1990s permitted a large 
extent of opportunistic behavior, rent shifting, bribery and corruption; and in some 
countries, vested interests have inhibited the pace of reform (Stiglitz 1999, EBRD 
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1999). Consequently, the process of building institutions in transition economies has 
taken more time than most reform scenarios envisaged in 1990.   
The time of extraordinary politics and the pace of reform depend on each 
country’s so-called market memory (Wolf and Havrylyshyn, 2002). Some countries 
were considered among the developed economies prior to World War II while others 
have gone directly from a feudal or early capitalist system to a socialist system. 
Moreover, the distinct cultural and systemic inheritances influence informal 
institutions such as norms and values in these countries. Consequently, Eastern 
Europe may develop distinctive forms of capitalism.  
In this environment, government policy and changes in the institutional 
framework are of pivotal concern to foreign investors (Meyer 2001b). The  transition 
has created specific policy- induced entry barriers, but also windows of opportunity for 
investors that established good relations or negotiated successfully with host 
governments. During radical institutional change, businesses cannot base their 
investment decisions on present institutions, as they are often transient and in some 
cases even inconsistent. Thus strategic flexibility and the ability to adapt to volatile 
rules and regulations can become crucial competitive advantages.  
Recent research in both economics and business strategy has, in part through 
the analysis of transition economies, recognized the importance of institutions for 
business development and thus economic growth (Djankov 2003, Murrell 2003, 
Meyer and Peng 2003). The interna tional business literature has long recognized the 
importance of government policy for the volume of FDI inflow and the strategies 
pursued by foreign investors. Institutional variables such as intellectual property 
rights protection (e.g. Oxley 1999) or political risk (e.g. Henisz 2000) have been 
incorporated in the study of foreign investment strategies, notably entry mode choice. 
However, the interaction between national economic institutions and enterprise level 
organizational strategies are still under-researched (Mudambi and Navarra 2002). This 
is particular relevant for transition economies because the underlying economic 
mechanisms are typically underdeveloped.  
Foreign investors are firstly concerned how governments drive the general 
process of creating institutions for the market economy and lowering barriers to entry. 
However, multinational enterprises (MNE) entering a country by acquisition of a local 
firm interact with local authorities in different ways than Greenfield investors. 
Investors by acquisition are concerned with privatization policies and with the 
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regulations of markets for corporate equity (Meyer, 2002). They often face bilateral 
negotiations, or multiple potential investors bidding for the same asset. Greenfield 
investors in contrast can often choose between many alternative sites for investment. 
They would thus have stronger bargaining positions vis-à-vis central or local 
authorities eager to attract FDI (Meyer and Nguyen, 2003, Jensen and Mallya, 2003). 
 This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we place the policy 
environment in CEE in a comparative context, before reviewing the impact of 
institutional development and government policy on foreign investment in Section 3. 
Section 4 and 5 focus on policy issues of concern to different types of investors 
depending on FDI entry-mode: acquisition vs. Greenfield. We conclude with an 
outlook on EU Enlargement, and point to the need for further research on the effect of 
policies on alternative types of FDI.  We support our arguments with data on the 
policies adopted in the region, and with case studies to enhance the understanding of 
the relevance of the issues at firm level. 
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2. A comparative perspective 
Despite their distinct heritage, the countries of CEE appear to be converging toward 
development paths of other emerging economies at similar levels of income and 
development. According to the investment development path (IDP), government 
policies are in part predetermined by the country’s level of development (Dunning, 
1993; Dunning and Narula, 2000). The IDP stipulates a macroeconomic relationship 
between FDI, governments and development. Countries advance through the stages of 
development following five typical stages, yet their path is moderated by their 
policies towards international businesses.  
The IDP proposes an endogenous relationship between the net-outward 
investment position (NOI per capita) of a country and its level of development 
proxied by GDP per capita.  Transition economies are at different stages of this 
process. Bulgaria, Romania and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 
countries for which we have data (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia) are at Stage 
1 or Stage 2 of their development process (Table 1). Their location advantages, 
inclusive government policies and the sophistication of market-oriented institutions 
do not suffice to attract major inflows of FDI, while they have little if any outward 
FDI. An outlier is Russia, which received considerable FDI in its oil and gas sector, 
while Russian MNEs  in this sector start investing abroad (Andreff, 2003). Yet relative 
to the size of the country, both inward and outward FDI in Russia remain small. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The Central European countries have reached a mature phase of stage 2, as 
they continue to receive large amounts of inward FDI. Outward FDI started, but 
primarily in form of ‘indirect’ FDI by affiliates of MNE, for instance Hungarian 
affiliates of western MNEs undertaking investment in Romania or Ukraine (Andreff 
2003). The Baltic Countrie s fall between the two major groups of countries, with 
Estonia belonging to a later phase of the Stage 2, while Latvia and Lithuania are still 
at early phases of stage 2. Slovenia falls in a category of its’ own, reaching Stage 3 on 
the IDP with outward FDI taking off (see also Svetlicic and Bellak 2001). 
The IDP literature suggests that countries start to liberalize their trade and FDI 
regimes as they advance in their stage of development (Dunning, 1993, Dunning and 
Narula, 2000). In other words, policy choices are to some extent endogenous to the 
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IDP and hence the development process. Policies are typically import substituting and 
inward- looking at Stage 1 and Stage 2, when FDI inflows are moderate. Policies start 
to become more open and oriented towards attracting and incorporating FDI into the 
development process as countries approach Stage 3. Investment incentives geared 
toward foreign investors may be adopted at this stage. At stages 4 and 5, policies 
towards outward investments may take on importance. 
The EBRD’s external liberalization index provides an indicator of the extent 
of liberal and non-interventionist investment regimes in terms of national rules and 
legislations. Table 1 shows the level of external liberalization (foreign trade and 
exchange) in CEE countries on a scale from 1 (socialist system features e.g. foreign 
trade is controlled by the state and the current account is not liberalized) to 4 + 
(standard for the most advanced industrial economies). These figures, albeit only a 
weak proxy for foreign investment legislation, indicate that liberal and outward 
oriented trade regimes are the rule rather than an exception among the former socialist 
countries, earning them the highest score in the EBRD assessment: 4 +.  Only 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine remain relatively unreformed or inward looking.  
  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
A more detailed picture is provided by particular rules and legislations related 
to FDI (Table 2): free establishment, equal treatment, foreigners ability to purchase 
land, non-selectivity, access to privatization and repatriation of profits. The rules and 
laws of the investment regimes in CEE largely confirm the evidence of the EBRD 
indices. Most countries offer highly liberalized regimes and often are ahead with 
legislative reforms relative to their level of development. Again the CIS countries 
stand out as the most inward looking and unreformed regimes with respect to foreign 
investment laws. However, this picture may still be too optimistic with respect ot CIS 
in view to the actual investment barriers experienced by investors (see below).  
Free establishment and profit repatriation are the norm across the region. 
Purchase of land by foreign investors is feasible in most countries, except Bulgaria, 
Belarus and Ukraine; while non-selectivity of the regulatory regime is still a concern 
in Russia and Ukraine. Other countries, like Slovenia, chose privatization methods 
that transferred ownership to domestic new owners and did not offer direct 
opportunities for foreign investors. However, in the late 1990s, opportunities for 
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greenfield FDI and acquisitions from private owners increased, such that the 
privatization methods become less important for the volume of FDI attracted by any 
country (Bevan et al. 2004).  New opportunities may emerge for acquisitions as 
insider-privatised firms in CIS may at some point in time need to raise capital, and 
thus seek foreign investors. 
Survey-based research, such as carried out by the Confederation of Danish 
Industries (2003), demonstrates various barriers to investment: non-tariff barriers, red 
tape, the quality and applicability of laws and corruption. Based on in-depth 
interviews conducted with 45 Danish investors in Eastern Europe in the period 2002-
2003, the study shows an increasing gap of barriers to entry in the Western and 
Eastern parts of the region. Barriers are far higher in the CIS countries. For example, 
the 19 licenses necessary to operate a business in Russia is among the largest in the 
world, whereas in Poland the number is 11 and in Denmark only 3. A similar example 
is corruption with Denmark being the 2nd least corrupt country in the world, Poland 
coming on rank 45 and Russia at the bottom of the list in the 71st place. 
Transition began from relatively similar starting points; however, the paths of 
institutional development vary considerably. Differences arise from both inherited 
features of the institutional framework and the institutional reform of the 1990s. 
Government policy has played an important role in shaping the evolution of new 
institutions regulating FDI.  
 
3. Institutional Development and International Business in CEE 
The process of institutional development and divergence has arguably been the most 
important aspect of government policy affecting FDI in CEE. Economic institutions  
establish the rules and regulations for domestic economic actors as well as foreign 
investors. Institutions cover both formal institutions such as laws and regulations and 
informal institutions such as business practices and customs (North 1990).  
For businesses operating in CEE, institutions are much more than background 
conditions. Eastern Europe has gone through a process of fundamental institutional 
change under pressure of both internal and external political, economic and social 
changes. Yet the remaining inconsistencies of institutions increase transaction costs, 
especially for new business relationships, and thus inhibit many potential business 
relations, in particular those of complex or long-term nature. The resulting co-
ordination failure has been a major cause of the deep recession of the early 1990's 
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(Swaan 1997). Yet it also affects international businesses with the transition 
economies. Western MNEs lack information on their partners; and they have to 
confront unclear regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracy and the weak 
enforcement of property rights (Meyer, 2001a, Bevan et al. 2004). 
The weaknesses of market institutions, and constraints on internalizing 
transactions, led to the widespread use of alternative, intermediate mechanisms of 
exchange through informal networks in CEE (Stark 1996), and even more in Russia 
(Puffer et al. 2000). Moreover, privatization created new forms of private ownership, 
including insider-owners and dispersed shareholders without effective stock market 
governance. Some of the largest firms in the region are subject to weak governance 
while enjoying close contacts to government and, in some CIS countries, considerable 
barriers to entry. Yet other firms have progressed far in shedding these legacies of the 
20th century. This diversity of governance mechanisms and of ownership patterns in 
the region may persist for many years.  
Foreign entrants have to accommodate local institutions when designing an 
entry strategy. At an aggregate level, the stage of development of institutions is 
crucial to attract FDI, by reducing the transactions costs of setting up a local 
operation. Empirical research about the impact of host country institutions on the 
volume of FDI indicates the general impact of the institutional, social and legal 
framework. For example, Brenton et al. (1999) show an economic freedom index to 
be positively related to FDI flows in CEE.  
Moreover, institutional variables influence specific strategic decisions such as 
the control, timing and location of foreign operations. Formal rules establish the 
permissible range of entry modes, for instance, with respect to equity ownership, and 
set the stage for possible bargaining between investors and authorities. Both formal 
institutions, such as the legal framework, and informal institutions, such as managerial 
networking, shape transaction costs in CEE, and consequently foreign investors’ 
preferred mode of entry (Meyer 2001a).  
Institutions and policy are particularly important when it comes to foreign 
investment by acquisition. In CEE, the institutions surrounding privatization set the 
context for foreign acquisition, as privatization policies and the policies affecting 
privatized firms have a direct bearing on the post-acquisition strategies (Meyer 2002) 
and performance (Uhlenbruck and DeCastro, 1998, 2000). We elaborate on these 
implications in section 4. 
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Bevan et al. (2004) investigate the impact of institutional development on FDI 
in transition economies and identify key factors by disaggregating subsets of 
institutional development. The results suggest that several institutional changes have 
particularly enhanced FDI receipts to transition economies:  
· Development of private-owned businesses in place of state-owned firms; 
· Development of the banking sector; but not necessarily the non-banking financial 
sector; 
· Liberalization of foreign exchange and trade; but not necessarily of domestic 
markets and prices. 
· Development of legal institutions; but not necessarily competition policy. 
 
Contrary to their expectations, Bevan et al. (2004) find that domestic price 
liberalization and the development of competition policy do not appear to be 
significant in motivating FDI. This may reflect that the possibility of earning 
monopoly rents attracts foreign investors, yet often without benefiting local customers 
in the host economy. Thus, policy makers also have to be aware that what is good for 
domestic economic development does not necessarily attract more foreign investors, 
though possibly different ones. For example, competition policy eases entry, but it 
makes it less attractive to acquire an incumbent monopolist. Governments privatizing 
telecommunications often face a trade-off, as liberalization would reduce prices for 
consumers, but also reduces receipts from selling the incumbent state-owned service 
provider. 
 Competition is regarded as at least as important as privatization for enterprises 
to improve their efficiency - a result fully consistent with empirical research on 
privatization in the West (e.g. Vickers and Yarrow 1991). Yet while many major 
Western privatizations are industries with natural monopolies that require complex 
regulation to create competition, most firms privatized in CEE in the 1990s enjoyed 
monopoly powers courtesy of past or present government policy. Aft er privatization it 
is essential that market forces are set free by removing administrative constraints. 
Firms in transition frequently face soft budget constraints and obtain protected market 
positions of various sorts. In Russia, a particular problem appears to be the lack of 
domestic entry, and thus contestable markets, in part due to protective intervention by 
regional authorities (Broadman 1999). 
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The development of informal institutions may co-evolve with the 
establishment of formal institutions (North 1990). This makes it difficult to 
empirically show the additional impact of informal institutions. Bevan et al. (2004) 
find one result that can be explained by discrepancies between the development of 
formal and informal institutions. A Russia dummy variable, while negative and 
significant under most model specifications loses value when combined with legal 
effectiveness. The lack of effective law enforcement may therefore help to explain the 
poor FDI performance of Russia. Thus, investors are more concerned about formal 
institutions than about informal ones, unless informal institutions show highly unusual 
features.  
In conclusion, government policy has been pivotal in creating new legal 
frameworks in transition economies, and indirectly influenced the social change that 
led to more gradual changes in informal institutions. Foreign investors have been 
affected by this institutional evolution while at the same time influencing institutional 
development. However, the research on which institutions are most critical for 
economic development, or for attracting FDI, does not yet allow conclusive answers. 
Below, we suggest that it may be more appropriate to disaggregate FDI by project 
characteristics to better understand the link between government policy and FDI 
inflows. 
BOX 1: OVERCOMING BARRIERS IN RUSSIA – THE DANDY WAY 
 
Despite reports of severe entry barriers in Russia there are also many examples of 
investors that have successfully overcome them and turned initial barriers into 
first-mover advantages. The Dandy case (a Danish chewing gum manufacturer 
acquired by Cadbury Schweppes in 2002) demonstrates this well. The company 
itself ascribes a great part of its success to the devotion of endless working hours 
towards establishing strong networks in Russia. This was done at all levels of the 
company-country hierarchy from the national to the regional and local levels. The 
CEO of Dandy spent initially months on establishing relations with Russian 
politicians at the highest level through private meetings, attending trade fairs and 
foreign investor promotions. Subsequently Dandy’s expatriate local management 
team turned its attention to the regional level whilst negotiating a special incentive 
package and analyzing the success of other companies having located in the 
Novogorod region. Having opened the factory focus turned to local administrators 
and not least to the extended community of the factory’s workers through 
sponsorships, the media, arranging parties and participation in charities. 
 
Source: Hansted (2003); and interview with former CEO of Dandy Russia Carsten Bennike.  
 11 
 
4. Acquisition entry, and the privatization processes 
At the onset of transition in 1989, state-enterprises dominated CEE economies, 
and the legal framework lacked provisions for the operation of firms in private 
ownership, let alone foreign ownership. This changed gradually, yet the institutional 
legacies induced many investors to partner with state enterprises. Joint ventures and 
acquisitions in the early to mid 1990’s were generally related to the privatization 
process as foreign investors cooperated with, or took over state-owned firms. 
Especially large FDI projects were implemented by acquiring equity stakes in state-
owned enterprises. Privatization thus offered unique opportunities for acquiring 
potentially lucrative assets at low prices.  
Yet early acquisitions also carried special risks: the valuation of former state 
enterprises in a rapidly changing environment was subject to high uncertainties, and 
the turn around of the acquired business required major post-acquisition investments 
(Meyer and Estrin 2001). The failure rate of acquisitions is high, even within and 
between mature market economies. Yet, managing an acquisition is even more 
daunting in transition economies where acquirers operate in an unstable institutional 
contexts, and may be subject to governmental interference at all times. 
 The acquisition and the subsequent restructuring of former state-owned 
enterprises necessitate intensive interaction between the investor and government 
authorities, primarily the privatization agency.  Moreover, the process typically 
involves many stakeholders in addition to the government. Groups such as employees 
of the firm, the management, local authorities, national unions, and media often take 
an active interest in privatization (Antal-Mokos 1998, Meyer 2002). Moreover, 
governments rarely act as homogeneous units, but different agencies and politicians – 
like a local town major – pursue their own objectives. Managing the complex network 
of relationships is crucial for the success of the acquisition process (Figure 2).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Local stakeholders have diverse objectives, which may not always be compatible with 
those of profit-oriented investors. In addition, local governments, management and 
workers’ councils with de jure or de facto influence on the negotiations complicate 
negotiation processes (Antal-Mokos 1998): 
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• Governments not only maximize their financial revenues, but also pursue 
broader social objectives. Consequently, privatization negotiations generally 
involve wider issues such as investment plans and employment guarantees. 
• Formally, potential buyers negotiate with the privatization agency. Yet a large 
number of agents inside and outside the firm try to influence the agency 
through formal or informal channels. This could degenerate into internal 
‘politicking’, where agents pursue individual goals to the detriment of the 
organization and potential foreign partners. 
• Frequently, managers and/or employees have attained considerable influence, 
especially in Poland and in many CIS countries.  
 
The involvement of multiple stakeholder groups often prolongs the negotiation 
process. As time passes, the competitive situation changes due to events both within 
the target firm and in its environment, as management may be unable to pursue 
strategic leadership while future ownership remains uncertain. Thus, the market 
position may erode, and tangible and intangible assets may deteriorate as insiders 
extract assets, key people leave, or the organization fails to invest. Such deterioration 
would diminish the firm’s prospects after privatization. 
 Yet, the governmental influence does not end with the formal privatization. 
Influences may be retained both direct, based on equity stakes of a state entity, or 
indirect. Political agents set regulatory policy, and they may exert moral suasion and 
political pressure in addition to interference based on specifically agreed terms in the 
privatization contract. State-owned enterprises often require deep organizational and 
strategic restructuring to be integrated in the investor’s global organization. This 
creates major managerial challenges for acquiring firms as the process and its political 
context are more complex that for conventional acquisitions (Meyer 2002). MNE 
would normally prefer to design and implement such strategies without outside 
interference to be able to focus on economic objectives. 
Governmental agencies other than the privatization agency can assert 
influence via formal institutions. Industrial regulation and competition policy have a 
particularly profound influence on market structure and, therefore, on post-
privatization performance (Uhlenbruck and DeCastro 1998). Privatization-related 
acquisitions from the late 1990’s onward have been primarily in sectors that require 
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substantive governmental regulation, such as telecommunications, banking and 
utilities. In these industries, the regulatory frame is key to privatization negotiations as 
the privatized firm may hold a monopoly position. Vigorous industry liberalization 
and competition policy would not be in the interest of a foreign investor that took over 
an incumbent firm.  
 Governmental influence is most explicit where the state retains a minority 
share. Many acquisitions in the privatization process occurred in a staggered pattern, 
and were thus registered as JV although from the beginning the investor attained 
management control and envisaged the acquisition of full ownership. Such an 
arrangement permits acquisitions in a particular institutional context, and has little in 
common with conventional joint ventures. A temporary minority stake of a 
government may offer advantages to both partners. The government obtains some 
control over the firm’s restructuring, and thus externalities created for the local 
economy, while capitalizing on the probable appreciation of the share value as the 
transition economy becomes less uncertain. Governments may also be reluctant to 
transfer control over firms deemed strategic, or trading with governmental institutions 
(Wright et al. 1993).  
 Investors normally aim for full control of acquired businesses not only to 
reduce transaction costs but also to enforce faster turnaround. In this respect, foreign 
investors may dislike the possible government interference in strategic decisions, but 
would appreciate the risk sharing, the lower amount of capital to be raised at the 
outset, and the access to local institutions and networks. If the acquirer attains 
management control, the influence of the co-owner on operational management may 
be limited.  
 Furthermore, the interests of the regional or local authorities may become 
more aligned with those of the acquiring firm if they share the profits. This should 
reduce undue bureaucracy and regulatory interference, while providing access to 
important public and private networks. Such informal networks are vital for 
businesses in transition economies, especially in Russia (Puffer et al. 2000, Holden et 
al. 1998) and China (Peng & Heath 1996). 
 Hence, minority government ownership can have contradictory effects. In 
mature market economies, firms in mixed ownership may generate lower profits 
because governments aim at social rather than financial returns. Yet this does not 
translate to transition economies, where for example Tian (2003) finds an inverse-U-
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shaped relationship between state-ownership stakes and corporate performance. 
Residual state ownership thus has both positive and negative effects.  
 Even without quity stakes, the authorities may retain rights in the privatization 
process. The privatization contract can create a principal-agent type relationship 
between the government and the acquirer beyond the privatization (Stark 1992). Deal 
terms can, for instance, stipulate employment guarantees, investment commitment, 
partial local ownership, or that the management team be staffed with nationals. The 
enforcement of such contracts, which were widely used for instance by the East 
German Treuhandanstalt, is however problematic and may lead to ongoing 
negotiations. 
Informal institutions may moderate the new owners’ control over the acquired 
business. Public opinion and, in consequence, political agents, frequently take an 
interest in formerly state-owned firms. This may trigger governmental intervention if 
the new owner’s actions are thought not to be in the country’s best interest. In 
addition to social objectives, politicians and bureaucrats may pursue personal 
objectives and engage in various form of rent-seeking behavior. This may foster 
corruption, as seen in Russia. Foreign investors have to distinguish legitimate social 
concern from individual rent-seeking behavior. 
 Acquirers thus have to be aware of potential conflicts with political agents, 
and of the social consequences of their corporate activity. Where legal and regulatory 
frameworks are not yet fully developed, politician may feel called upon to interfere in 
former state-owned firms in case of social conflicts.  
 In conclusion, foreign investors entering CEE by privatization-acquisitions 
typically have to negotiate with multiple stakeholders in the firm, the government, and 
society. The relationship between government and the foreign investor extends 
beyond the time of formal take-over of the firm as acquirers pursue the often 
necessary deep restructuring of the acquired firm, while governments or political 
groupings are concerned with the social consequences of such restructuring processes. 
MNEs aiming to enter a foreign country by acquiring a local firm thus are 
most concerned with the institutions governing markets for corporate control, which 
in CEE implies privatization policies, and policies vis-à-vis privatized enterprises.  
They are also concerned with a range of other policies, such as regulatory policies vis-
à-vis market incumbents, and informal means of exerting political influence on 
business. 
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5. Greenfield entry, and the bargaining for subsidies 
Greenfield investors do in contrast not normally have to deal with privatisation 
agencies or the regulation of natural monopolies. Their investment rarely conflicts 
with existing power structures in bureaucracies or incumbent firms.  
Greenfield investor’s relationships with authorities are more likely aimed at 
realizing mutual benefits. Local governments welcome investors that promise 
employment opportunities, technology spillovers and taxable revenues. Their 
eagerness to attract FDI may translate in competition between different authorities 
offering investment incentives, and provides considerable bargaining power to some 
potential investors, notably those considering large projects and aiming to serve more 
than a local market. 
Incentive schemes abound in CEE at the turn of the century. A variety of 
incentives are offered to potential investors, the most common being tax holidays. 
They are likely to converge to the EU rules1 as the CEE countries enter the EU, 
starting with the first wave in 2004. Many CEE countries will be allowed to offer 
incentives within the EU for some time either within the rules of the EU, or because 
of the transitory arrangements that are part of the accession process (The 
Commission, 2003). Hence, such schemes will continue to be important and may 
affect in particular location decisions of Greenfield investors offering large 
manufacturing projects. Moreover, the CEE countries entering the EU will have 
access to new resources through the structural funds, which may be used also for 
investment incentives. However, this may induce the new members to use more 
systematic and transparent rules and to abstain from anti-competitive or illicit 
practices.  
Investors seeking to establish production facilities for global markets often 
face a wide choice of locations. To produce goods that are subject to low 
transportation costs and be distributed easily to worldwide markets, investors can 
search worldwide for an optimal site. Especially if they do not require specific local 
inputs, but offer substantial potential spillovers to the local environment, they can use 
                                                 
1 Under EU rules, incentives may be used primarily for regional policy (including labour market and 
R&D policies) under the EU structural funds. For example, only the relatively poor regions (with GDP 
below 75 percent of EU average at present) are allowed within the EU to use incentives as a way to 
attract new businesses to their location. But many regions in Eastern Europe will fall in this category 
 16 
their leverage to negotiate with local authorities to obtain favorable conditions. Local 
or national authorities may offer not only financial and fiscal incentives (i.e. tax 
exemptions), but promise investment in infrastructure development. 
For investors, these incentives offer direct financial advantages and may even 
add to the strategic-assets of the company. For instance, policy may create the basis 
for dynamic economies of scale in locations through provisions of temporary 
incentives or protection from import competition as in the Central European car 
industry (Werner, 2003).  On the other hand, recipients of subsidies put their 
reputation on the line, if for example they fail to balance government objectives 
connected to the incentive schemes and its own business objectives. Firms that 
participate in an incentive scheme, but subsequently do not live up its conditionality, 
can expect negative press reaction. This also holds true for firms that enter into a non-
transparent deal with a government, which may make the public wonder what is kept 
secret. Incentive schemes are often linked to performance requirements, made 
attractive by a gift package of dollar bills. Failure to live up to the performance 
criteria may damage a firm’s reputation and lead to complex legal issues and possible 
need to repay received subsidies.  
                                                                                                                                            
during the first decade of membership. For general exemptions for granting State Aid in the EU, see 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/citizen_stateaid.html. 
BOX 2: THE EMERGENCE OF A CAR INDUSTRY CLUSTER 
 
The car industry is the most prominent example of how Brownfield investment 
opportunities along with Greenfield investments into special economic zones in 
various locations in CEE, spiced up by incentives may corroborate to establish a 
geographical cluster of producers. Research shows how the car industry in Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary is located within a radius of only 200 km. Hence 
agglomeration economies emerged thanks to a combined government strategy 
taking outset in the location of existing facilities. It has been enhanced by 
incentives and competition among neighbouring locations in different countries.  
The symbiosis between government and international business in the car 
industry has created a critical mass in the industry. This policy opened 
opportunities for both acquisition and Greenfield FDI during a window of 
opportunity. It allowed investor to overcome the high barriers in the beginning of 
transition process and facilitated larger and more risky projects. The early entrants 
in turn created new windows of opportunity for later investors such as sub-
suppliers in the car industry. Investment barriers have come down faster than in 
other industries because of a fit between government and investor objectives. The 
Czech authorities recognized early that they would only be able to overcome the 
technological gap to the world car industry by attracting foreign investor, and 
inducing them to, in particular VW, to locate substantive value adding activity 
here. Ten years later, this has become the basis for one of CEEs strongest industry 
clusters. 
    
Sources: Werner (2003), Meyer (2000). 
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Most CEE countries use SEZs as part of their FDI policies. They come in two 
formats: 
 
· Free economic zones, where investors are exempted from paying customs 
duties or other taxes, possibly conditional on certain performance 
requirements related to employment or exports, and  
· Industrial parks or ‘technology parks’, where the aim is to build clusters of 
industry that will generate spillovers to the local economy.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of incentive schemes in Eastern Europe, based on a study 
by Dresdner Bank (2003), complemented with qualitative information obtained from 
the homepages of national investment agencies.2 Almost all countries in CEE offer 
some type of incentive scheme. The only exceptions are Estonia and Lithuania, which 
however offer some of the lowest corporate tax rates in the world. This shows how 
CEE countries seek to market their regions in the investor community in terms of cost 
advantages.  
On a less regular basis, several countries also use incentives in relation to 
special economic zones (SEZs). These policies primarily focus on the provision of 
infrastructure or pools of labour with a specific skill structure. Most countries 
combine both types of incentives. However, in Table 3 also the usage of regular 
incentive schemes has been put in parentheses in those cases where a case-by-case 
approach has been the overwhelming one, as in Latvia and Lithuania.  
Especially in the countries furthest to the east, incentives are tied to SEZ, e.g. 
in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland and in CIS countries. The main performance 
requirements relate to job creation, and in some  countries such as Hungary and Czech 
Republic also to the amount of capital invested. In practice, the requirements may not 
differ much, as all countries aim to attract large investors with manufacturing projects 
to the least developed regions, either directly by setting job creation objectives or 
                                                 
2 For example, in the case of Russia, the information provided by Dresdner Bank is very scant. Visiting 
the official investment site of Russia (www.inves.ru) reveals that Russia has adopted a case-by-case 
approach as the rules under which incentives may be provided are expressed rather vaguely. 
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indirectly by creating SEZs in the least developed regions with high unemployment. 
Hence performance requirements are overall not a major constraint for business, 
except perhaps in some of the countries applying a case-by-case approach where part 
of the package negotiated may include strict local content requirements. If the 
company subsequently divests prior to the termination of the incentive contract it 
must be prepared to pay back the value of incentives which may amount to as much as 
50% of the original investment (Jensen and Mallya, 2002). Whether such contracts are 
enforceable is another matter. 
Some countries offer incentives at several levels of government. In the Polish 
system, probably the most decentralised, incentives can only be negotiated with the 
local governors of the SEZs. Such decentralization offers opportunities for 
entrepreneurial local authorities to create a more investor friendly environment where 
central reforms are sluggish or inconsistent, as observed in Vietnam (Meyer and 
Nguyen 2003).  
In other cases (Czech Republic and Ukraine), the additional layers of 
government may pose both a blessing and a curse to the managers at the negotiation 
table. Investors may be able to negotiate higher subsidies if multiple sources of funds 
are available. At the same time, the danger of multiple requests for special favours 
increases, such that the net gain from obtaining incentives can be difficult to foresee, 
and costs of negotiating may exceed received benefits. Hence in countries where the 
incentive-negotiation environment is very complex (case-by-case approach, large size 
of informal economy and several layers of negotiation), such as Ukraine, competent 
legal counsellors may be a prerequisite to negotiating for incentives. 
The provision of incentives related to trade, e.g. import protection in 
combination with incentives can be an important strategic aspect to investors not only 
in the CIS, but in all CEE countries (Werner, 2003). Hence Table 3 gives only 
indicative information about the prevailing nature of incentive schemes, while a case-
by-case approach has been adopted all over the region vis-à-vis very large investors. 
 These incentive schemes can broadly be divided into two groups: the 
transparent and publicly visible schemes and the less transparent schemes negotiated 
between top government and (typically very large) multinational investors on an 
individual case-by-case basis (UNCTAD, 2003). Transparent incentive schemes 
available to all investors meet certain criteria attract mainly medium and large 
investors with cost oriented motives. The non-transparent incentives are often 
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associated with major multinational firms building government relations, which then 
can be viewed as a strategic asset. However, to our knowledge there exists very little 
research on how multinationals can build and exploit government relations in CEE, in 
part probably because of the non-transparent aspects of these deals. 
In the countries that are not (yet) acceding to the EU, the case-by-case 
approach to investors might lead to more corrupt behaviour by government 
representatives (UNCTAD, 2003). Since these countries are beyond the immediate 
reach of institutional spillovers from the EU, and have a high estimated share of 
informal economy (Johnson and Kaufmann, 2001), they may be more prone to adopt 
non-transparent incentive schemes. 
In conclusion, investment incentive schemes are widespread in CEE, and often 
relate to the creation of SEZ. They aim at attracting capital and employment to 
particular regions, and focus on Greenfield manufacturing projects. Yet, do these 
schemes have had any visible impact in terms of crowding- in FDI. 
Most studies, even at the national or local level, suggest that incentive 
programs generally fail to crowd-in FDI (Morriset and Pirnia, 2000, Oman, 2000). In 
a panel analysis of the transition countries, Beyer (2002) finds that the announcement 
of incentive programs has among other factors little impact on their attraction of FDI. 
An earlier review of tax incentives in transition countries by Holland and Owens 
(1996) also concludes that incentives appear to play a marginal role in attracting 
investors. In a study of the Czech Incentive Scheme, Jensen and Mallya (2002) find 
based on survey data for 135 investors in manufacturing that at most the scheme 
succeeded in crowding- in total investments with 3-5% per year. However, within the 
target group of Greenfield investors in manufacturing the marginal impact is 
somewhat greater at 10 % per year.  
The strongest impact of incentives schemes has been reported for in the car 
industry, in combination with a host of other location advantages (Werner, 2003) – 
see also Box 2 above. This pattern may be replicated in other industries, if incentives 
help develop industrial clusters that might become regional hubs for production in the 
enlarged EU. However, the type of deal that the Czech government stroke with VW in 
the early 1990, which included for instance temporary infant industry tariff protection, 
would not be permissible under WTO rules, let alone EU membership. 
The main effect of incentives offered on the rim of the EU appears to be to 
attract investments to one country under the nose of its neighbour, rather than raising 
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overall investment in the region. This competition for FDI is intensifying before 
accession to the EU (UNCTAD, 2003). A similar battle for FDI rages among 
countries of the ‘old’ EU. With high unemployment, slow economic growth, and the 
relative insecurity about what Enlargement will bring in terms of geographical 
reorganisation of industries, governments resort to incentive schemes as leverage 
when negotiating with potential investors. 
This empirical evidence suggests that investment incentives schemes have 
become more systematic (transparent) and marginally more important to the location 
decision of Greenfield investors in large manufacturing projects in CEE. However, 
these incentives have mainly influenced the marginal cost of locating in one CEE 
country rather than another. As Greenfield investments increase where privatization is 
completed, zones may become more important for investors’ location strategy. 
Incentives will continue to influence the location strategies of Greenfield 
investors after EU accession, since most of the CEE region will be eligible to use such 
incentive schemes in the foreseeable future. Moreover additional funds may be 
available when the EU programs are extended to accession countries. Countries with 
the administrative capabilities to manage incentives schemes such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary may offer a major benefit to investors negotiating for 
incentives. But with rising income and wage levels in the EU accession countries, 
zones have to offer both incentives and attractive resource endowment, especially 
human capital, to attract investors.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The transition economies have gone through a rapid process of institutional 
development. During this period, extraordinary politics have created unique business 
opportunities for investors who could manage government-relations in a rapidly 
changing context.  
With the EU Enlargement in 2004, the period of extraordinary politics is 
coming to a close. Yet this does not imply an end to proactive FDI policies; rather, 
future policies will be adapted to the overall legal EU framework. The policy agenda 
is shifting. While some windows of opportunity are closing others are opening up. 
Rather than privatization, the main policy questions of the near future are likely to 
center on regional policy within the EU frameworks and EU competition policy in an 
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enlarged Union. New opportunities in the CIS countries depend on their progress with 
internal reforms and enterprise restructuring. 
The relevant policy issues of concern to investors vary over time, and with the 
type of FDI. This feature should also apply in other regions, and we thus propose that 
policy researchers differentiate more clearly the impact of policy and institutions on 
different types of FDI, for instance by mode of entry between FDI by acquisition and 
Greenfield respectively. This chapter has shown that acquisitions in Eastern Europe 
have created complex relationship between government policy, business strategies 
and institutional development. Governments and multinational firms face difficult 
balancing acts to manage their interdependencies, and to secure mutual benefits. For 
Greenfield investments, the mutual benefits among the various stakeholders involved 
appear more obvious and conflict less with other objectives of economic policy. 
For FDI by acquisition, key concerns relate to the bargaining with 
privatization and regulation authorities and the restructuring of formerly state-owned 
enterprises. However, foreign investors increasingly acquire private firms. This 
reduces the intensity of their interaction with the authorities, yet when buying a 
recently privatized firm, they may still face deep restructuring to shed the legacy of a 
firm once run as a socialist enterprise. 
Foreign investors pursuing Greenfield entry have more degrees of freedom 
with respect to their intra-country location choices. This gives them high bargaining 
power vis-á-vis local municipalities, and the opportunity to take advantage of special 
incentives in SEZs and industrial parks. For local policy makers, this raises the 
challenging policy issue of whether they want to attract FDI by offering special 
incentives, which might benefit the specific location but come at the cost of overall 
social welfare. Empirical evidence suggests that incentive are only effective to certain 
types of FDI, i.e. large scale manufacturing Greenfield projects that do not depend on 
specific locational advantages. Incentive programs thus encourage only certain types 
of FDI. Policy makers would hope that these are projects with the largest spillovers. 
However, a major explanatory factor for such policy is the relative bargaining 
positions of authorities and MNE. Governments aiming to attract foreign investors by 
selling a strong local firm, such as an incumbent telecom operator, have a valuable 
asset and thus often a strong bargaining position. It is less strong if they seek a partner 
for a loss-making firm in a declining industry such as steel. To attract Greenfield 
investors, countries offering distinct locational advantages such as an industrial 
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cluster or human capital have stronger negotiation positions then those offering only 
financial incentives.  
 
References: 
Andreff, Wladimir (2003): ‘The Newly emerging Transnational Corporations from 
Transition Economies – Comparison with Third World outward foreign direct 
investment’, forthcoming in Transnational Corporations. 
Antal-Mokos, Z.  1998.  Privatisation, Politics, and Economic Performance in 
Hungary.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bevan, Alan A., Saul Estrin and Mark Schaffer (1999): Determinants of Enterprise 
Performance during Transition, Working Paper no. 99/03, Center for 
Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. 
Bevan, A., S. Estrin and K. Meyer (2003): Foreign Investment Location and 
Institutional Development in Transition Economies, International Buiness 
Review, 13 (2004), no. 1, p. 43-64.  
Beyer, J. (2002). ‘Please invest in our country – how successful were the tax incentive 
for foreign investment in transition countries?’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 35, pp 191-211. 
Brenton, P., F.  Di Mauro & M.  Lücke.  1999.  Economic Integration and FDI: An 
Empirical Analysis of Foreign Investment in the EU and in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Empirica, 26(2): 95-121. 
Clark, E. & A. Soulsby. 1995. Transforming former state enterprises in the Czech 
Republic. Organization Studies 16: 215-242. 
The Commission (2003): ‘Report on the results of the negotiations on the accession of 
Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuanad, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to the European Union’, paper 
prepared by the Commission’s departments, The Commission for the 
European Union, Brussels. 
DI(2003): ‘En slagkraftig og barrierefri Østersøregion? – Spræng murbrokkerne 
væk!’, Confederation of Danish Industries, June 2003, Copenhagen. 
Djankov, S., E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2003): The 
new comparative economics, Journal of Comparatve Economics 31, p. 595-
619. 
Dresdner Bank (2003): Investing in Central and Eastern Europe, July 2003, Dresdner 
Bank AG, Group Economics, Frankfurt am Main. 
Dunning, J. 1993. Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Wokingham, 
UK: Addison-Wesley. 
Dunnning, J. and R. Narula (1996): Foreign direct investment and governments, 
catalysts for economic restructuring, London: Routledge. 
EBRD.  1999, 2001.  Transition Report.  London: European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development.   
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1991.  Firm Ownership Preferences and Host Government 
Restrictions.  An Integral Approach.  Journal of International Business 
Studies, 21: 1-22. 
Guisinger, S.  et al.  1985.  Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements, 
Patterns of International Trade, Production and Investment.  New York: 
Praeger. 
Hellman, Joel S., G. Jones, D. Kaufmann and M. Schankerman (2000): ‘Measuring 
Governance, Corruption and State Capture – How Firms and Bureaucrats 
 23 
Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies’, WB Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 2312, The World Bank, Washington. 
Henisz, W. J.  2000.  The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment.  
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16(2): 334-64. 
Holden, N., C. Cooper and J. Carr (1998): Dealing with the New Russia: Management 
Cultures in Collision, Chichester et al.: Wiley. 
Holland, David and Jeffrey Owens (1996). ‘Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: 
The Experience of the Economies in Transition’, Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation, 50 (2). 
Jensen, C. and T.J.S. Mallya (2002): ‘Are FDI incentive programs a good investment 
for the host country? – an empirical evaluation of the Czech National 
Incentive Scheme’ revised CEES Working Paper, no. 2002-46, Centre for East 
European Studies, Copenhagen Business School. 
Jensen, C. and T.J.S. Mallya (2003): ’Foreign direct investment and regional growth 
in transition economies – a comparative study of the Czech Republic and 
Poland’, unpublished working paper. 
Johnson, Simon and Daniel Kaufmann (2001): ‘Institutions and the Underground 
Economy‘, in (eds. Havrylyshyn, O. and S.M. Nsouli) A Decade of Transition: 
Achievements and Challenges, The International Monetary Fund, Washington.  
Meyer, K.E.  2000. International Production Networks and Enterprise Transformation 
in Central Europe, Comparative Economic Studies 42, p. 135-150. 
Meyer, K.E.  2001a.  Institutions, Transaction Costs and Entry Mode Choice.  Journal 
of International Business Studies, 31(2): 257-67.   
Meyer, K.E.  2001b.  International Business Research on Transition Economies, in: T. 
Brewer and A. Rugman, eds: Oxford Handbook of International Business, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Meyer, K. E. 2002. Management challenges in privatization acquisitions in transition 
economies. Journal of World Business, 37: 266-276. 
Meyer, K.E. and S. Estrin (2001): Brownfield Entry in Emerging Markets, Journal of 
International Business Studies 31, no. 3, p. 575-584. 
Meyer, K.E. and H.V. Nguyen (2003): Foreign Investor’s Entry Strategy and Sub-
national Institutions in Vietnam, SMS Mini-conference, Hong Kong, 
December 2003. 
Meyer, K.E. and M.W. Peng 2003. Identifying Leading Theories for research on 
Central and Eastern Europe:  Transactions, Resources and Institutions, mimeo, 
Copenhagen Business School and Ohio State University.  
Morisset, Jacques and Neda Pirnia (2000). ‘How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect 
Foreign Direct Investment – A Review’, Policy Research Working Paper, 
2509, (Washington: The World Bank). 
Mudambi, R. and R. Navarra 2002. Institutions and International Business: A 
Theoretical Overview, International Business Review 11, no. 6, p. 635-646. 
Murrell, P. (2003): Firms facing new institutions: transactional governance in 
Romania, Journal of Comparatve Economics 31, p. 695-714.  
North, D.C.  1990.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Development, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Oman, Charles (2000).  Policy competition for foreign direct investment – a study of 
competition among governments to attract FDI, (Paris: Development Center 
Studies, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 
 24 
Oxley, J.E.  1999.  Institutional Environment and the Mechanisms of Governance: 
The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure of Inter-Firm 
Alliances.  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38(3): 283-310. 
Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. 1996. The growth of the firm in planned economies in 
transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choices. Academy of 
Management Review, 21 (2): 492-528. 
Puffer, S., D. McCarthy, & A. Naumov. 2000. The Russian capitalist experiment: 
From state-owned organizations to entrepreneurships. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
Stark, D. (1992): Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central 
Europe, East European Politics and Society 6, p. 17-54. 
Stark, D. 1996. Recombinant property in East European capitalism. American Journal 
of Sociology, 101: 993-1027. 
Stiglitz, J.  1999.  Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition.  Keynote address at the 
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, 
Washington. 
Svetlicic, M. and C. Bellak (2002): ‘The Investment Development Path of Small 
Countries: Comparative Evaluation of Slovenia and Austria’, paper prepared 
for the AIB 2002 Annual Meeting, in San Huan, Puerto Rico. 
Swaan, W. 1997. Knowledge, transaction costs and the creation of markets in post-
socialist economies, in: P.G. Hare & J. Davis, eds: Transition to the Market 
Economy: 53-76. London: Routledge. 
Tian, G. (2002): Corporate Governance in China, unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
London Business School.  
Uhlenbruck, K. and J. de Castro (1998): Privatization from the Acquirer’s 
Perspective: A Mergers and Acquisitions Model, Journal of Management 
Studies 35, p. 619-640. 
Uhlenbruck, K. and J. de Castro (2000): Foreign Acquisitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Outcomes of Privatization in Transitional Economies, Academy of 
Management Journal,. 
UNCTAD (2003): World Investment Directory – Volume VIII Central and Eastern 
Europe 2003, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: New 
York and Geneva. 
Vickers, J. & G. Yarrow (1991): Economic Perspectives on Privatization, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5, no. 2, p. 111-132. 
Werner, R. (2003): ‘Location, Cheap Labor and Government Incentives: A Case 
Study of Automotive Investment in Central Europe Since 1989’, Chazen Web 
Journal of International Business, Spring 2003 
(www.gsp.columbia.edu/chazenjournal). 
World Bank (2002): ‘Far from Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards 
of Governance in Transition Economies?’, WB Discussion Paper, The World 
Bank, Washington. 
Wright, M., S. Thompson and K. Robbie (1993): Finance and Control in Privatisation 
by Management Buy-out, Financial Accountability and Management 9, no. 2, 
p. 75-99. 
 
 
 25 
Table 1: FDI and Institutional development, 2001 
Country FDI stock 
per 
capita, 
US$ 
NOI 
per 
capita, 
US$ 
EU 
member-
ship 
External 
liberali-
sation 
Privati-
zation 
(large) 
Compe-
tition 
policy 
Legal 
effective-
ness 
Stage 1-2 countries 
Albania  240 -215 No 4 + 3 1 2 
Belarus 140 -135 No 2 1 2 3 
Bulgaria  490 -475 Cand. 4 + 4- 2+ 4- 
Latvia 920 -820 In 2004 4 + 3 2+ 4 
Lithuania  725 -710 In 2004 4 + 3+ 3 4- 
Moldova 140 -140 No 4 + 3 2 4- 
Romania 340 -335 Cand. 4 3+ 2+ 4 
Russia  150 -50 No 3-  3+ 2+ 4- 
Ukraine 95 -90 No 3 3 2+ 3 
Stage 2-3 countries 
Estonia  2290 -1980 In 2004 4 + 4 3- 4 
Czech 
Republic  
2610 -2525 In 2004 4 + 4 3 3 
Hungary 2375 -1935 In 2004 4 + 4 3 4- 
Poland 1100 -1075 In 2004 4 + 3+ 3 3 
Slovak 
Republic  
1130 -1060 In 2004 4 + 4 3 3+ 
Stage 3 country 
Slovenia  1415 -1012 In 2004 4 + 3 3- 4 
Notes: column 4: Cand. = candidate country, membership forecasted for 2007. No = not member and membership not 
expected in the near future. Column 5 to 8: EBRD transition indicators, based on annual assessment by the 
Chief Economist’s office of the EBRD, scale 1= ‘socialist system feature’ 4 = ‘standard and performance 
norms of advanced industrial economies’.  
Sources: Figure 1 and EBRD (2002): Transition Report , European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London. 
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Negotiation Process
- length of process
- agents involved
Constraints on restructuring
- political context
- government ownership
Restructuring strategies
- resource upgrading
- creating new capabilities
- learning and education
Post-acquisition
performance
Figure 2: A Process Perspective on Privatization Acquisitions
The state-
owned firm
The
government
The foreign
investor
(acquirer)
 
Source: Meyer (2002).  
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Table 2: Investment rules and legislation in individual CEE countries        
Free   Equal  Purchase Non-  Access to Profit   
                                                    establishment treatment of land  selectivity privatisation repatriation  
 
Stage 1-2 Albania v  v  (v)  (v)  v  v   
  Belarus  v  (v)  (-)  (-)  (-)  v   
  Bulgaria  v  (v)  (-)  (v)  (v)  v   
  Latvia  v  v  v  v  (v)  v 
  Lithuania  v  v  (v)  v  (v)  v 
  Moldova  v  v  v  (v)  (v)  v 
  Romania v  v  v  (v)  v  v 
  Russia  v  (v)  (v)  -  (-)  v 
  Ukraine v  (v)  (-)  -  (v)  v   
Stage 2-3 Estonia v  v  v  v  v  v 
  Czech Rep. v  v  v  (v)  (v)  v 
 Hungary v  v  v  v  v  v   
  Poland  v  v  v  (v)  (v)  v   
  Slovak Rep. v  v  v  (v)  (v)  v   
Stage 3 Slovenia v  v  (v)  v  (-)  v 
                 
Notes v= Fully applicable, (v)= Applicable with some exceptions, (-)=Not applicable with some exceptions, -=Not applicable 
Source: UNCTAD (2003):World Investment Directory, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on the Internet (www.unctad.org).
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Table 3: Overview of regular incentive schemes offered in Eastern Europe   
 Tax holidays Tax rate  Strategic  Special   Performance 
or subsidies   incentives economic    requirements/ 
                        (regular basis)     zones1  special objectives 
 
Bulgaria      (Yes) 28 % (20%) No  6 zones  Tied to zones 
         Job creation 
          Case-by-case 
 
Romania         Yes 25%   Yes  30 parks   Size 
          Tied to zones 
 
Russia       (Yes) 24%  No  5+ free zones Size   
         Tied to zones 
          Case-by-case 
 
Ukraine       (Yes) 30%  No  15+ zones Tied to zones 
          Case-by-case 
          Partly decentralised 
          Size    
Estonia           No  26%  No  Ports only No 
 
Latvia       (Yes) 19%  No   Ports only Case-by-case 
         Hi-tech 
Lithuania      (No) 13-15%   Yes  3 free zones Very large size 
        + 2 parks Case-by-case  
Czech Rep.     Yes 31%  Yes  13+ zones Size 
       & parks   Job creation 
Corp. services & R&D 
        Partly decentralised 
Hungary         Yes 18%  Yes  75+ zones   Size 
        & parks   Structurally weak 
          areas, Environment 
 
Poland          Yes 27%  Yes  14+ zones Tied to zones   
      & parks   Fully decentralised 
 
Slovak Rep.    Yes 25%  Yes  9+ parks  Job creation 
 
Slovenia          Yes 25%  No  8+ free zones Job creation 
          Partly decentralised 
          Case-by-case  
Notes: 1 In ‘free zones’ (in short: zones) investors mainly benefits from lower taxes and trade duties. ‘Industry parks’ (in 
short: parks) have objectives beyond cost-cutting, such as trying to attract particular types of industry that 
match with already existing industries in the area or the skill-structure of the region. 
Source: Dresdner Bank (2003): Investing in Central and Eastern Europe, Dresdner Bank AG, Group Economics, 
Frankfurt am Main, and the homepages of the national investment agencies in the Czech Republic 
(www.czechinvest.cz), Poland (www.paiz.gov.pl) and Russia (www.inves.ru). 
